Captain Edward James Smith's Decisions the Night Titanic Sank
Captain Edward James Smith was 62 years old when he sailed on the Titanic, which would be his last voyage (“Captain Edward John,” ). Smith had been commodore of the White Star Fleet since 1904 (“Captain Edward John,” ) and had over 40 years of sailing experience (Wilkinson & Hamilton, 2011). With those 40 years it would seem that he would not ignore the warnings of ice that were coming in, but by looking closer did he really ignore them? There were five reports of ice received before Smith made the decision to change course (Barratt, 2010). According to Mr. Cooper, the author of a book on Captain Smith, Smith was not ignoring the ice warnings; he was simply not reacting to them. Ice warnings were just warnings that a ship sent saying that they had seen ice at a certain location (Kasprzak, 2012).
Also, Smith made the decision to not slow down the ship even though there were reports of ice (Barratt, 2010; Wilkinson & Hamilton, 2011). Smith was a forceful sailor who would push his ships hard in certain conditions and it was not uncommon for captains to sails ships into regions with ice at full speed, or 21-22 knots in Smith’s case. The weather was calm and clear which gave no reason for Smith to slow the ship down (Kasprzak, 2012), and it was even observed that he told Lightoller that if the weather became hazy they would have to slow down (Barratt, 2010). Comparing Captain Smith’s decision to not slow down the ship to other captains’ choices: testimonies were found by other captains stating that they would not have slowed down the ship either, because the weather was calm and clear. These testimonies occurred at the inquiries following the tragedy (Kasprzak, 2012). From my personal experience at the traveling exhibit, even though the night was clear and calm, the visibility from the bridge was limited. The exhibit set up a simulation that showed what the bridge would have looked like the night of the tragedy (McCord, 2012) and was similar to what the cadets at the Maine Maritime Academy use to see if they can avoid the iceberg in 37 seconds ("Avoiding disaster on," ). I could barely see out the window, so it is easy for me to understand how the cadets and First Officer Murdoch would have difficulty seeing out the bridge ("Avoiding disaster on," ; McCord, 2012). The Titanic was reliant upon the lookouts in the crows nest because from my personal experience the lights and windows in the bridge made it hard to spot anything floating in the water ("Avoiding disaster on," ; McCord, 2012). In my personal opinion, with so many warnings of ice, the ship should have been slowed down, allowing for a longer reaction time to avoid the iceberg (McCord, 2012).
On the night of April 14, 1912, Captain Smith also decided to leave the bridge to attend a dinner party during the most crucial part of the voyage (Wilkinson & Hamilton, 2011). He normally took meals in the dinner saloon in his cabin, but since he was retiring after this voyage, George Widener held a dinner party in his honor, with guests representing the cream of 1912 society (“Captain Edward John,” ). He left the party early to talk to Lightoller at the bridge, then retired to his cabin at around 9:20 pm, again leaving the bridge during an important part of the voyage, at night, with warnings of ice (Barratt, 2010). Compared to the disaster of the Titanic, in 1911 Captain Smith was in charge of the Olympic when it collided with the HMS Hawke while leaving the Southampton harbor (Wilkinson & Hamilton, 2011). Unlike the Titanic, the ships did not sink but they did incur more damage than the near miss the Titanic had with the New York in the Southampton harbor on her maiden voyage (Barratt, 2010; Wilkinson & Hamilton, 2011).
Based on Captain Smith’s experience level, I believe he was justified in all of his decisions. Comparing Smith’s decision to not slow down the vessel due to the weather, to other captains’ decisions in the same situation, the decisions are the same. Smith was a risk taker and did push his ships (Kasprzak, 2012), but with all his experience he cannot be blamed for the disaster of the Titanic. He can be blamed for neglecting his duties during a crucial part of the voyage: the night run (Barratt, 2010). His presence on the bridge at the time of the impact or shortly before it might have resulted in the slowing down of the ship due to visibility, but of that no one can be sure. Other factors culminated into the tragedy that befell the Titanic, and Captain Smith’s decision to leave the bridge and run the vessel at 20 to 21 knots through possible icebergs, ultimately led to his downfall (McCord, 2012).
The pictures above are of the Titanic's bridge and wheel house ("Titanic bridge and," Titanic bridge and wheel house) and Captain Edward Smith ("Captain Edward John," Captain Edward John Smith).
Also, Smith made the decision to not slow down the ship even though there were reports of ice (Barratt, 2010; Wilkinson & Hamilton, 2011). Smith was a forceful sailor who would push his ships hard in certain conditions and it was not uncommon for captains to sails ships into regions with ice at full speed, or 21-22 knots in Smith’s case. The weather was calm and clear which gave no reason for Smith to slow the ship down (Kasprzak, 2012), and it was even observed that he told Lightoller that if the weather became hazy they would have to slow down (Barratt, 2010). Comparing Captain Smith’s decision to not slow down the ship to other captains’ choices: testimonies were found by other captains stating that they would not have slowed down the ship either, because the weather was calm and clear. These testimonies occurred at the inquiries following the tragedy (Kasprzak, 2012). From my personal experience at the traveling exhibit, even though the night was clear and calm, the visibility from the bridge was limited. The exhibit set up a simulation that showed what the bridge would have looked like the night of the tragedy (McCord, 2012) and was similar to what the cadets at the Maine Maritime Academy use to see if they can avoid the iceberg in 37 seconds ("Avoiding disaster on," ). I could barely see out the window, so it is easy for me to understand how the cadets and First Officer Murdoch would have difficulty seeing out the bridge ("Avoiding disaster on," ; McCord, 2012). The Titanic was reliant upon the lookouts in the crows nest because from my personal experience the lights and windows in the bridge made it hard to spot anything floating in the water ("Avoiding disaster on," ; McCord, 2012). In my personal opinion, with so many warnings of ice, the ship should have been slowed down, allowing for a longer reaction time to avoid the iceberg (McCord, 2012).
On the night of April 14, 1912, Captain Smith also decided to leave the bridge to attend a dinner party during the most crucial part of the voyage (Wilkinson & Hamilton, 2011). He normally took meals in the dinner saloon in his cabin, but since he was retiring after this voyage, George Widener held a dinner party in his honor, with guests representing the cream of 1912 society (“Captain Edward John,” ). He left the party early to talk to Lightoller at the bridge, then retired to his cabin at around 9:20 pm, again leaving the bridge during an important part of the voyage, at night, with warnings of ice (Barratt, 2010). Compared to the disaster of the Titanic, in 1911 Captain Smith was in charge of the Olympic when it collided with the HMS Hawke while leaving the Southampton harbor (Wilkinson & Hamilton, 2011). Unlike the Titanic, the ships did not sink but they did incur more damage than the near miss the Titanic had with the New York in the Southampton harbor on her maiden voyage (Barratt, 2010; Wilkinson & Hamilton, 2011).
Based on Captain Smith’s experience level, I believe he was justified in all of his decisions. Comparing Smith’s decision to not slow down the vessel due to the weather, to other captains’ decisions in the same situation, the decisions are the same. Smith was a risk taker and did push his ships (Kasprzak, 2012), but with all his experience he cannot be blamed for the disaster of the Titanic. He can be blamed for neglecting his duties during a crucial part of the voyage: the night run (Barratt, 2010). His presence on the bridge at the time of the impact or shortly before it might have resulted in the slowing down of the ship due to visibility, but of that no one can be sure. Other factors culminated into the tragedy that befell the Titanic, and Captain Smith’s decision to leave the bridge and run the vessel at 20 to 21 knots through possible icebergs, ultimately led to his downfall (McCord, 2012).
The pictures above are of the Titanic's bridge and wheel house ("Titanic bridge and," Titanic bridge and wheel house) and Captain Edward Smith ("Captain Edward John," Captain Edward John Smith).